




In this paper, I present and criticize a number of influential
anti-skeptical strategies inspired by Wittgenstein’s remarks
on ‘hinges’. Furthermore, I argue that, following Wittgen-
stein’s analogy between ‘hinges’ and ‘rules of grammar’, we
should be able to get rid of Cartesian skeptical scenarios as
nonsensical, even if apparently intelligible, combinations of signs.
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1 The Cartesian Skeptical Paradox
The feature of Cartesian style arguments is that we cannot know certain
empirical propositions (such as ‘Human beings have bodies’, or ‘There
are external objects’) as we may be dreaming, hallucinating, deceived
by a demon or be “brains in the vat” (BIV), that is, disembodied brains
floating in a vat, connected to supercomputers that stimulate us in just
the same way that normal brains are stimulated when they perceive
things in a normal way.1 Therefore, as we are unable to refute these
skeptical hypotheses, we are also unable to know propositions that we
would otherwise accept as being true if we could rule out these scenarios.
Cartesian arguments are extremely powerful as they rest on the Clo-
sure principle for knowledge. According to this principle, knowledge
is “closed” under known entailment. Roughly speaking, this princi-
ple states that if an agent knows a proposition (e.g., that she has two
hands), and competently deduces from this proposition a second proposi-
tion (e.g., that having hands entails that she is not a BIV), then she also
knows the second proposition (that she is not a BIV). More formally:
The “Closure” Principle
If S knows that p, and S competently deduces from p that q,
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thereby coming to believe that q on this basis, while retaining
her knowledge that p, then S knows that q2.
Let’s take a skeptical hypothesis, SH, such as the BIV hypothesis men-
tioned above, and M, an empirical proposition such as “Human beings
have bodies” that would entail the falsity of a skeptical hypothesis. We
can then state the structure of Cartesian skeptical arguments as follows:
(S1) I do not know not-SH
(S2) If I do not know not-SH, then I do not know M
(SC) I do not know M
Considering that we can repeat this argument for each and every one of
our empirical knowledge claims, the radical skeptical consequence we can
draw from this and similar arguments is that our knowledge is impossible.
2 Wittgenstein on Skepticism; A Minimal Reading
A way of dealing with ‘Cartesian style’ skepticism is to deny the premise
S1) of the skeptical argument, thus affirming contra the skeptic that we
can know the falsity of the relevant skeptical hypothesis.
For instance, in his “A defence of commonsense” ([16], henceforth
DCS) and “Proof of the external world” ([17], henceforth PEW), G. E.
Moore famously argued that we can have knowledge of the ‘commonsense
view of the world’, that is, of propositions such as, ‘Human beings have
bodies’, ‘There are external objects’ or ‘The earth existed long before
my birth’ and that this knowledge would offer a direct response against
skeptical worries.
Wittgenstein wrote the 676 remarks published posthumously as On
Certainty ([48], henceforth OC) under the influence of DCS and PEW,
and in particular in the context of conversations he had about these
papers with his friend and pupil Norman Malcolm3.
As I have briefly mentioned supra, according to Moore, it is possible
to provide a direct refutation of Cartesian-style skepticism, thus claiming
contra the skeptic that we can know the denials of skeptical hypotheses.
But, Wittgenstein argues, to say that we simply ‘know’ Moore’s ‘ob-
vious truisms’ is somewhat misleading, for a number of reasons.
Firstly (OC 349, 483), because in order to say ‘I know’ one should
be able, at least in principle, to produce evidence or to offer compelling
grounds for his beliefs; but Moore cannot ground his knowledge-claims
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with evidence or reasons because (OC 245) his grounds aren’t stronger
than what they are supposed to justify. As Wittgenstein points out, if
a piece of evidence has to count as compelling grounds for our belief in
a certain proposition then that evidence must be at least as certain the
belief itself. This cannot happen in the case of a Moorean ‘commonsense
certainty’ such as ‘I have two hands’ because, at least in normal circum-
stances, nothing is more certain than the fact that we have two hands
([34]). As Wittgenstein writes in OC:
If a blind man were to ask me “Have you got two hands?” I
should not make sure by looking. If I were to have any doubt
of it, then I don’t know why I should trust my eyes. For why
shouldn’t I test my eyes by looking to find out whether I see
my two hands? What should be tested by what? (OC 125).
Imagine, for instance, that one attempted to legitimate one’s claim to
know that p by using the evidence that one has for p (for example, what
one sees, what one has been told about p and so on). Now, if the evidence
we adduced to support p was less secure than p itself, then this same
evidence would be unable to support p:
My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain
as anything that I could produce in evidence for it. That is
why I am not in a position to take the sight of my hand as
evidence for it (OC 250).
Moreover, Wittgenstein argues, a knowledge-claim can be challenged by,
for instance, the appeal to evidence and reasons; more generally, when
we challenge a knowledge claim we can recognize what and if something
has gone wrong in the agent’s process of knowledge-acquisition. Things
are somewhat different in the case of the denials of Moore’s ‘obvious
truisms of the commonsense’; if, for instance, I believe that I am sitting
in my room whilst I am not, there are no grounds on which this belief
could be explained as a mistake, as an error based on negligence, fatigue
or ignorance. On the contrary, a similar ‘false belief’ would more likely
be the result of a sensorial or mental disturbance (OC 526). As Moyal-
Sharrock points out ([18], 74), in fact, for Wittgenstein if someone was
holding seriously a denial of Moore’s ‘truisms’ (i.e., she believed she had
no body or that both her parents were men) we would not investigate
the truth-value of her affirmations, but instead her ability to understand
the language she is using or her sanity (OC 155).
If Moore’s ‘commonsense certainties’ are still not knowable, argues
Wittgenstein, they are immune from rational doubt. This is so (OC
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310) because doubts must be based on grounds; that is, they have to
be internal to a particular practice and must be in some way or another
justified. If they aren’t, they are constitutively empty. To illustrate this
point, Wittgenstein gives the example (OC 310) of a pupil who con-
stantly interrupts a lesson, questioning the existence of material objects
or the meaning of words; far from being a legitimate intellectual task,
the pupil’s doubt will lack any sense and will at most lead to a sort of
epistemic paralysis, for she will just be unable to learn the skill or the
subject we are trying to teach her (OC 315).
Accordingly, as per Wittgenstein, all reasonable doubts presuppose
certainty (OC 114-115); that is, the very fact that we usually raise doubts
of every sort at the same time shows and implies that we take something
for granted. For example, a doubt about the real existence of an histori-
cal figure presupposes that we consider certain an ‘obvious truism of the
commonsense’ such as, ‘The world existed a long time before my birth’;
a doubt about the existence of a planet presupposes the absence of any
doubt about the existence of the external world and so on (OC 114-115,
514-515).
But if the statements listed by Moore in DCS are not knowable
or doubtable, what is their status? With regard to Moore’s ‘truisms’,
Wittgenstein introduces a concept that is pivotal to understand his anti-
skeptical strategy and at the same time extremely elusive: Moore’s ‘com-
monsense certainties’ are, in his words, ‘hinges’. Wittgenstein uses this
term on different occasions, as in OC 341-3, where he writes:
The question that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact
that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were
the hinges on which those turn [. . . .] that is to say, it belongs
to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things
are in deed not doubted [. . . ] If I want the door to turn, the
hinges must stay put.
That is to say, ‘hinges’ are just apparently empirical contingent claims;
on closer inspection, they perform a different, more basic role in our
epistemic practices.
3 Wright’s Unearned Warrant
So far, I have just sketched Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical reflections.
Given the elusiveness and obscurity of his work, there is no consensus
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on how we should interpret Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategy and
especially the concept of ‘hinges’.
An influential ‘Wittgenstein-inspired’ anti-skeptical position is
Crispin Wright’s ‘rational entitlement strategy’ ([53], [54]), which can
be summarized as follows4.
On Wright’s account, ‘hinges’ such as, ‘There are external objects’,
‘Human beings have bodies’ or ‘The world existed long before my birth’
are beliefs whose rejection would rationally necessitate extensive reor-
ganisation, or the complete destruction, of what should be considered as
empirical evidence and more generally of our epistemic practices.
As per Wright, then, each and every one of our ordinary inquiries
would then rest on ungrounded presuppositions, ‘hinges’; but still, since
the warrant to hold Moore’s ‘obvious truisms’ was acquired in an epis-
temically responsible way, we could not dismiss them simply because
they were groundless as this would lead to complete cognitive paralysis
([53], 191).
Following this reading of OC, then, Cartesian skepticism can only
show that everyday epistemic practices rest on ungrounded presupposi-
tion. But a system of thought, purified of all liability to Moore’s ‘obvious
truisms of the commonsense’, would not be that of a rational agent; thus,
we have a default rational basis, an entitlement, to believe in ‘hinges’.
In this way, Wright argues, we are able to know the denials of skeptical
hypotheses; and if we can have some sort of knowledge of ‘hinges’ such as
‘Human beings have bodies’ or ‘There are external objects’, we are also
able to retain confidence in our everyday empirical knowledge claims.
A first problem for the entitlement strategy (see [29], [12] and [27])
is that Wright seems to miss a crucial distinction between practical and
epistemic rationality. That is, to accept a non-evidentially warranted
hinge would be practically rational, as we obviously need to set aside
Cartesian skeptical concerns to pursue any kind of inquiry and to achieve
cognitive results ([12], 26). But Cartesian skeptical scenarios are not
meant to put under discussion the practical rationality of taking for
granted Moore’s ‘obvious truisms of the commonsense’; rather, they are
meant to assess the epistemic rationality of trusting our senses when it is
impossible to refute a skeptical scenario such as the BIV one. Thus, even
if it would be entirely rational to set aside skeptical concerns whenever
we wanted to pursue a given epistemic practice, a Cartesian skeptic can
nonetheless argue that the fact that we need true beliefs about the world
does not make our acceptance of ‘hinges’ epistemically rational.
Moreover, as has been highlighted by Pritchard ([32], [33]), a crucial
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issue for the entitlement strategy is the very idea of a belief being ra-
tionally grounded in something like an entitlement. This is so because
to believe a proposition is to believe that proposition to be true; and if
this is right, then it is hard to understand how we can have a rational
entitlement to take a ‘hinge’ for granted without having any reason to
consider the ‘hinge’ at issue to be true.
Accordingly, if we cannot say, strictly speaking, that we believe in a
‘hinge’, for we have no reason to consider it true, then we cannot have
knowledge of it either; a mere trusting of or acceptance in the hinge at
issue will not suffice. And if this is right, then we cannot have knowledge
of ‘hinges’, even if we are ‘rationally entitled’ to take them to be true.
4 Pritchard on the Structure of Reason
Wittgenstein’s reflections on the structure of reason have influenced
a more recent ‘Wittgenstein-inspired’ anti-skeptical position, namely
Pritchard’s ‘hinge-commitment’ strategy (forthcoming).
To understand his proposal, recall the following remarks we have
already quoted supra:
If you are not certain of any fact, you cannot be certain of
the meaning of your words either [. . . ] If you tried to doubt
everything you would not get as far as doubting anything.
The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty (OC 114-
115).
The question that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact
that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were
the hinges on which those turn [. . . .] that is to say, it belongs
to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things
are in deed not doubted [...] If I want the door to turn, the
hinges must stay put (OC 341-3).
As per Pritchard, here Wittgenstein would claim that the same logic
of our ways of inquiry presupposes that some propositions are excluded
from doubt; and this is not irrational or based on a sort of blind faith,
but rather belongs to the way rational inquiries are put forward (see
OC 342)5. As a door needs hinges in order to turn, any rational evalua-
tion would require prior commitment to an unquestionable hinge/set of
‘hinges’ in order to be possible at all.
A consequence of this thought (forthcoming, 3) is that any form of
universal doubt such as the Cartesian skeptical one is constitutively im-
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possible6; there is simply no way to pursue an inquiry in which nothing
is taken for granted. In other words, the same generality of the Carte-
sian skeptical challenge is based on a misleading way of representing the
essentially local nature of our enquiries.
A proponent of Cartesian skepticism looks for a universal, general
evaluation of our beliefs; but crucially there is no such thing as a general
evaluation of our beliefs, whether positive (anti-skeptical) or negative
(skeptical), for all rational evaluation can take place only in the context
of ‘hinges’ which are themselves immune to rational evaluation.
An important consequence of Pritchard’s proposal is that it will not
affect Closure. Each and every one of our epistemic practices rests on
‘hinges’ that we accept with a certainty that is the expression of what
Pritchard calls “u¨ber-hinge’ commitment’: an a-rational commitment
toward our most basic belief that, as we mentioned above, is not itself
opened to rational evaluation and that importantly is not a belief.
To understand this point, just recall Pritchard’s criticism of Wright’s
rational entitlement. As we have seen, Wright argues that it would be
entirely rational to claim that we know Moore’s ‘obvious truisms of the
commonsense’ whenever we are involved in an epistemic practice which is
valuable to us; but Pritchard argues that in order to know a proposition
we need reasons to believe that proposition to be true. And as, following
Wright, we have no reason to consider ‘hinges’ true but the fact that we
need to take them for granted, then we cannot have knowledge of them
either.
With these considerations in mind, we can come back to Pritchard’s
“u¨ber-hinge’ commitment’. As we have seen, this commitment would
express a fundamental a-rational relationship toward our most basic cer-
tainties, a commitment without which no knowledge is possible. Cru-
cially, our basic certainties are not subject to rational evaluation: for
instance, they cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed by evidence and thus
they are non-propositional in character (that is to say, they cannot be
either true or false). Accordingly, they are not beliefs at all. This can
help us retain both the Closure principle and our confidence in our most
basic certainties. Recall the reformulation of the Closure principle we
have already encountered supra:
The Competent Deduction Principle
If S knows that p, and S competently deduces from p that q,
thereby coming to believe that q on this basis, while retaining
her knowledge that p, then S knows that q .
The crucial aspect of this principle to note ([33], 14) is that it involves an
8 KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy, AO, AO(AO): 1–28
agent forming a belief on the basis of the relevant competent deduction;
the idea behind Closure is in fact that an agent can came to acquire new
knowledge via competent deduction, where this means that the belief in
question is based on that deduction. Accordingly, if we could not rule
out a skeptical scenario such as the BIV one, we would be unable to know
Moore’s ‘obvious truisms of the commonsense’ such as, ‘Human beings
have bodies’ or ‘There are external objects’ and thus, given Closure, we
would be unable to know anything at all.
But our most basic certainties are not beliefs; rather, they are the ex-
pression of a-rational, non-propositional commitments. Thus, the skeptic
is somewhat right in saying that we do not know Moore’s ‘obvious tru-
isms of the commonsense’; but this will not lead to skeptical conclusions,
for our ‘hinge commitments’ are not beliefs so they cannot be objects of
knowledge. Therefore, the skeptical challenge is misguided in the first
place.
A first concern that can be raised against this proposal goes as fol-
lows. Recall that, following Pritchard‘s account, the skeptical challenge
is based on a misleading way of representing the nature of our epistemic
inquiries; as there is nothing like the kind of general enquiry put forward
by a Cartesian skeptic, we should rule out skeptical worries for they are
at odds with the ways in which rational inquiries are put forward.
However, a skeptic can surely grant that our everyday enquiries are
essentially local in nature and that our ordinary knowledge claims are
made within a background of ‘hinge-commitments’; but this is just a
reflection of what epistemic agents do in normal circumstances, and can
at most tell us how our psychology works whenever we are involved in
any given epistemic practice. Still, the mere fact that ordinarily we take
for granted several ‘hinge commitments’ does not necessarily exclude as
illegitimate the kind of general, theoretical inquiry put forward by a
proponent of Cartesian skepticism; for the Cartesian skeptical challenge
is first and foremost a philosophical paradox, which cannot be dismissed
on the basis of pragmatic reflections about the essentially local nature
of our everyday epistemic practices.
However, even if we agree with Pritchard that a general evaluation of
our beliefs is somewhat impossible and self-refuting there is still another
deep concern that the ‘hinge commitment strategy’ has to face. Recall
that following this proposal, all our epistemic practices rest on unsup-
ported commitments. If this approach can help us to block the skeptical
challenge it will nonetheless have a cost: under skeptical scrutiny, we will
be forced to admit that all our epistemic practices rest on ungrounded
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presuppositions which are not open to epistemic evaluation of any sort.
When skeptical hypotheses are in play, we are then forced to admit
that all our knowledge rests on nothing but a-rational presuppositions
such as habit, instinct and social or cultural commitments. Accordingly,
Pritchard’s ‘hinge-commitment’ strategy leads to a more subtle form of
skepticism which undermines the rationality of our ways of inquiry: a
conclusion which is no more reassuring than skepticism itself7.
5 Certainty vs Knowledge
Another influential account of Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategy is
Moyal-Sharrock’s ‘non-epistemic’ reading8; in order to understand this
proposal, consider the ‘obvious truisms of the commonsense’ listed by
Moore:
There exists at present a living human body, which is my
body. This body was born at a certain time in the past,
and has existed continuously ever since, though not without
undergoing changes; it was, for instance, much smaller when
it was born, and for some time afterwards, than it is now.
Ever since it was born, it has been either in contact with or
not far from the surface of the earth; and, at every moment
since it was born, there have also existed many other things,
having shape and size in three dimensions [. . . ] from which
it has been at various distances. . . ([16], 33).
What all these statements have in common is that they refer to the
empirical world (physical objects, events, interactions) and so they look
like empirical propositions. But, argues Moyal-Sharrock, differently from
empirical claims they are unquestionable, indubitable and nonhypotheti-
cal ([18], 85) statements that cannot be confirmed or falsified by expe-
rience; and as Wittgenstein states in his Cambridge Lectures ([50], 16,
quoted in [18], 92), ‘a statement which no experience will refute’ is a
‘rule of grammar’:
[. . . ] The proposition describing this world-picture might be
a part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of
rules of a game (OC 95, my italics). When Moore says he
knows such and such, he is really enumerating a lot of em-
pirical propositions which we affirm without special testing;
propositions, that is, which have a peculiar logic role in the
system of our empirical propositions (OC 136).
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Despite their differences, then, for Moyal-Sharrock all ‘hinges’ share a
common feature: namely, they are all rules of grammar which underpin
our ‘language-games’. This is why, she argues, Wittgenstein considers
Moore’s knowledge claims in both DCS and PEW as misleading if not
completely wrong; for differently from empirical beliefs, ‘hinges’ cannot
be known. To clarify this matter, consider the following entry:
And now if I were to say “It is my unshakeable conviction
that etc”, this means in the present case too that I have not
consciously arrived at the conviction by following a particu-
lar line of thought [my italics], but that it is anchored in all
my questions and answers, so anchored that I cannot touch
it (OC 103).
As per Moyal-Sharrock, this entry highlights the peculiarity of our re-
lationship with ‘hinges’. Our taking them for granted is not based on
justification or grounds; for instance, “I cannot say that I have good
grounds for the opinion that cats do not grow on trees or that I had
a father and a mother” (OC 282). That is, we hold these beliefs unre-
flectively, for they are not the result of any inquiry and they cannot be
supported by any kind of evidence.
Still, our lack of grounds for holding ‘hinges’ does not entail the
dramatic conclusions of the Cartesian skeptic, for our relationship with
Moore’s ‘commonsense certainties’ is based on training, instinct, re-
peated exposure ([20], 9): that is, hinges are the result of pre-rational,
still perfectly legitimate commitments and are the expression of what
Moyal-Sharrock ([18], [19], [20], [21]) calls “objective certainty” ([18],
15-17). This is a concept that she sees as constitutively different from
knowledge; knowledge-claims, in fact, require grounds and/or justifica-
tions, are open to doubt and can be verified or disconfirmed by evidence.
On the contrary, our confidence in the hinges “...lie[s] beyond being jus-
tified and unjustified; as it were, as something animal.” (OC 359).
As per Moyal-Sharrock, our relationship with the ‘hinges’ is not epis-
temic or rational at all (hence ‘non-epistemic reading’); following her no-
tion of objective certainty our confidence in the hinges should be seen as
kind of doxastic attitude, both as a disposition and an occurrence ([18],
54-56). Quoting Wittgenstein:
It is just like directly taking-hold of something, as I take
hold of my towel without having doubts (OC 510).
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And yet this direct taking-hold corresponds to sureness, not
to a knowing (OC 511).
On Moyal-Sharrock’s reading, these remarks suggest that our ‘objective
certainty’ is “akin to instinctive or automatic behavior: to a direct taking
hold or thought-less grasp” ([18], 62). That is to say, this certainty is a
disposition of absolute, animal confidence that is not the result of reason-
ing, observation or research but is rather a basic attitude of unreasoned,
unconscious trust that shows itself in our everyday experiences.
In other words, our confidence in Moore’s ‘obvious truisms of the
commonsense’ such as, ‘There are external objects’ or ‘Human beings
have bodies’ is not a theoretical or presuppositional certainty but a prac-
tical certainty that can express itself only as a way of acting (OC 7,
395); for instance, a ‘hinge’ such as ‘Human beings have bodies’ is the
disposition of a living creature, which manifests itself in her acting in the
certainty of having a body ([18], 67), and manifests itself in her acting
embodied (walking, eating, not attempting to walk through walls etc).
Following Moyal-Sharrock’s account of Wittgenstein’s strategy,
Cartesian-style skepticism is the result of a Categorial Mistake9. That
is, Cartesian skeptical arguments, even if prima facie compelling, rest
on a misleading assumption: the skeptic is simply treating ‘hinges’ as
empirical, propositional knowledge-claims while on the contrary they ex-
press a pre-theoretical animal certainty, which is not subject to epistemic
evaluation of any sort.
Due to this categorial mistake, a proponent of Cartesian Skepticism
conflates physical and logical possibility ([18], 170). That is to say, skep-
tical scenarios such as the BIV one are logically possible but just in the
sense that they are conceivable; in other words, we can imagine skepti-
cal scenarios, then run our skeptical arguments and thus conclude that
our knowledge is impossible. Still, skeptical hypotheses are nothing but
fictional scenarios and once we conflate the logical possibility with the
human possibility of being a BIV, then we are making a categorial mis-
take ([18], 170-171).
A consequence of this thought is that Cartesian skeptical scenar-
ios depict a fictional possibility, not a human one; thus, the skeptical
challenge is neither a sensible nor legitimate doubt but rather an ‘idle
mouthing of words’ ([18], 174). The mere hypothesis that we might be
disembodied brains in the vat has no strength against the objective cer-
tainty of ‘hinges’ such as, ‘There are external objects’ or ‘Human beings
have bodies’, just as merely thinking that ‘human beings can fly unaided’
has no strength against the fact that human beings cannot fly without
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Therefore, skeptical beliefs such as ‘I might be a disembodied BIV’
or ‘I might be the victim of an Evil Deceiver’ are nothing but belief-
behaviour ([18], 176) and the conclusion we can draw from them, namely
that our knowledge is impossible, should be regarded as fiction and not
as a possibility:
There are contexts then, for the most part: fictional con-
texts, where the doppelga¨nger of a universal hinge consti-
tutes a falsifiable proposition. But the negation of a fictional
proposition does not entail the negation of any of its dop-
pelga¨nger. ‘I do not know whether I am a human being’ pro-
nounced in ordinary circumstances is nonsense. It is not non-
sense when pronounced in a fictional context. The problem is
that philosophers illegitimately transfer the meaningfulness
inherent in the fictional situation to real -life situations ([18],
170, my italics).
Following the ‘non-epistemic reading’, then, Wittgenstein would dismiss
Cartesian-style skepticism as the result of a categorial mistake, based on
a confusion between imagined and human/logical possibility. Differently
from Wright then, according to Moyal-Sharrock, hinge certainties such
as, ‘There are external objects’ and ‘Human beings have bodies’ are
conceptually, rather than practically, indubitable ([18], 161), whereas
the empirical doppelganger of a hinge (i.e. a sentence made up of the
same words as a hinge, but which does not function as a hinge) can
be doubted. So in ordinary and philosophical contexts ‘hinges’ can’t be
doubted; but the same sentence used as an empirical proposition in a
sci-fi novel can be.
Accordingly, as long as we take skeptical hypotheses as fictional sce-
narios they make sense but their apparent intelligibility is conflated with
human possibility. For instance, the BIV hypothesis is a scenario but is
just a fictional one that cannot be applied to ‘our human form of life’; in
the world as we know it we cannot even sensibly conceive the existence
of bodiless brains connected to supercomputers, or the existence of Evil
Deceivers that systematically deceive us and so forth ([18],178). Thus,
the strength of Cartesian-style skepticism is, so to speak, only apparent;
and once we take skeptical hypotheses as mere ‘philosophical fiction’, we
should simply dismiss skeptical worries, for a fictional scenario such as
the BIV one does not and cannot have any consequences whatsoever on
our epistemic practices or, more generally, on our ‘human form of life’.
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This part of the ‘non-epistemic reading’ seems weak for a number of
reasons. If, from one side, Moyal-Sharrock stresses the conceptual, log-
ical indubitability of Moore’s ‘truisms’, she nonetheless seems to grant
that the certainty of ‘hinges’ stems from their function in a given con-
text, to the extent that they can be sensibly questioned and doubted
in fictional scenarios where they can ‘play the role’ of empirical propo-
sitions. But crucially, if ‘hinges’ are ‘objectively certainty’ because of
their role in our ordinary life, a skeptic can still argue that in the con-
text of philosophical inquiry Moore’s ‘commonsense certainties’ play a
role which, similar to the role they play in fictional scenarios, is both at
odds with our ‘human form of life’ and still meaningful and legitimate.
Moreover, despite Moyal-Sharrock’s insistence on the conceptual, log-
ical indubitability of Moore’s ‘truisms of the commonsense’, her ren-
dering of Wittgenstein’s strategy seems to resemble Wright’s proposal
([39],45), thus incurring the objections I have already raised against
this reading. As I have argued throughout this work, to simply state
that Cartesian skepticism has no consequence on our ‘human form of
life’ sounds like too much of a pragmatist response against the skeptical
challenge. This is so because a skeptic can well agree that skeptical hy-
potheses have no consequence on our everyday practices or that they are
just fictional scenarios; also, she can surely grant that Cartesian-style
arguments cannot undermine the pre-rational confidence with which we
ordinarily take for granted Moore’s ‘obvious truisms of the common-
sense’. But crucially, and as Wittgenstein was well aware, a skeptic can
always argue that she is not concerned with practical doubt (OC 19) but
with a, so to speak, purely philosophical one.
Also and more importantly, even if we agree with Moyal-Sharrock
on the ‘nonsensical’ nature of skeptical doubts, this nonetheless has no
strength against Cartesian style skepticism. Recall the feature of Carte-
sian skeptical arguments: take a skeptical hypothesis SH such as the
BIV one and M, a mundane proposition such as, ‘This is a hand’. Now,
given the Closure principle, the argument goes as follows:
(S1) I do not know not-SH
(S2) If I do not know not-SH, then I do not know M
Therefore
(SC) I do not know M
In this argument, whether an agent is seriously doubting if she has a
body or not is completely irrelevant to the skeptical conclusion ‘I do
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not know M’. Also, a proponent of Cartesian-style skepticism can surely
grant that we are not BIV, or that we are not constantly deceived by
an Evil Genius and so on. Still, the main issue is that we cannot know
whether we are victim of a skeptical scenario or not; thus, given Closure,
we are unable to know anything at all.
Moyal-Sharrock does not explicitly discuss this issue, but her ‘non-
epistemic’ reading so construed seems to leave us with two options, nei-
ther of which is particularly appealing.
If we stress the ‘non-epistemic’ nature of ‘hinges’ while claiming that
Cartesian skeptical hypotheses have no strength whatsoever against our
knowledge claims, we will be forced to reject a very intuitive principle
such as Closure.10
If, on the other hand, we do not want to reject Closure, it is hard
to see how the ‘non-epistemic’ reading can help us to solve the skep-
tical problem. For the conclusion we can draw from this proposal is
that Cartesian skepticism is unlivable and at odds with our everyday
experience; but still, given Closure and the fact that we cannot know
the denials of skeptical scenarios, it is impossible to escape skeptical
conclusions.
Even if more promising than the other ‘OC inspired’ anti-skeptical
proposals I have considered so far, it seems that, nonetheless, the ‘non-
epistemic reading’ cannot represent a satisfactory anti-skeptical strat-
egy. Nevertheless, there are many promising insights we can draw from
Moyal-Sharrock’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thought and especially
from the analogy between ‘hinges’ and ‘rules of grammar’, which I will
consider in the next section.
6 Hinges and Rules of Grammar
Very generally, in the second phase of his thought, Wittgenstein calls
rules of grammar ‘the conditions, the method necessary for comparing a
proposition with reality’ ([49], 88). Thus, for Wittgenstein, everything
that determines the sense of an expression belongs to its ‘grammar’,
which also specifies the licit combinatorial possibilities of an expression
(for instance, which combinations make sense and which don’t, which
are allowed and which are not allowed’, cfr. [13], 146). To understand
this point, consider the following statements:
i) What is red must be colored
ii) Nothing can be red and green all over
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iii) All bachelors are unmarried
iv) A proposition is either true or false
v) 12 x 12 = 144
Despite their differences, all these share a number of significant common
features. Firstly, they are all normative as they delimit what it makes
sense to say, for instance, licensing and prohibiting inferences. Just
consider i): if p is called red is correctly characterised as ‘colored’, to
say that it is red and to deny that it is colored would be a misuse of
language, that is, a move excluded from a language-game. Similarly ii),
even if it looks as if it is a description of the physics of color, is in fact a
rule that we use to exclude the description of an object as being red and
green all over. iii) looks like a true statement of fact about bachelors but
is, rather, meant to explain the meaning of the word ‘bachelor’. iv) looks
like a description, a generalization about propositions in the same way
that the statement ‘All lions are carnivorous’ is a generalization about
lions. However, things are somewhat different, for we use iv) to define
what may be correctly called ‘a proposition’ in logical reasoning; also, it
does not exclude a third possibility but rather excludes as meaningless
the phrase ‘a proposition which is neither true nor false’11.
Finally12, central to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is the
view that mathematically necessary truths are not descriptive but nor-
mative; for instance, v) licenses and prohibits inferences, in the sense
that it licenses transformations of empirical statements and at the same
time excludes other inferences as invalid. Following v)13, we can le-
gitimately transform the statement: ‘There were 12 books each on 12
shelves in the bookshop’ into: ‘There were 144 books in the bookshop’;
also, v) excludes as illegitimate, ‘There were 12 books each on 12 shelves,
so there were 1212 books in the bookshop’ (an inference which is also
excluded by the true inequation 12× 12 6= 1212).
A second feature of Wittgenstein’s ‘rules of grammar’ is that they
cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed by reality; rather, they determine
what counts as a possible description of reality. That is to say, state-
ments like i) and ii) cannot be confirmed by empirical evidence, but
are, rather, presupposed by any ‘language game’ with color words; also,
these grammatical rules cannot possibly be disconfirmed by reality, say
by the existence of a ‘colorless red object’ or of ‘something that is red
and green all over’. Likewise, we could not verify iii) by, for instance,
investigating the marital status of people identified as bachelors, and no
‘married bachelor’ could possibly disconfirm iii).
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Similarly, even if we do perfectly well speak of half-truths, or rough
or approximate truths or of something being partly true or partly false,
this does not affect iv) in any way, for the objects of such assertions
are not cut to the pattern required for logical inference and thus cannot
be considered propositions; therefore, these assertions cannot confirm or
disconfirm iv) ([13], 265). Finally, even if we could imagine a different
arithmetic in which v) could turn out to be wrong and v*) 12 x 12 =
1212 was correct, this would not disconfirm v), for this v*) would simply
not belong to the practice we call ‘arithmetic’.
A third and important feature of Wittgenstein’s ‘rules of grammar’
is that they are not propositions; namely, they cannot be either true
or false for their ‘negation’ is not false but senseless. Just consider the
following sentences:
i*) p is red and is not colored
ii*) p is red and green all over
iii*) Some bachelors are married
iv*) a proposition is neither true nor false
v*) 12 x 12 = 1212
All these are nothing but nonsensical, even if intelligible, combinations
of signs14. If this is obvious for the putative statements from i*) to iv*),
then, as per Wittgenstein, even an ‘equation’ such as v*) is senseless
rather than simply false. As he argued in one of his lectures:
The application of a mathematical sentence occurring in our
language is not to show us what is true or false but what is
sense and what is nonsense. This holds for all mathematics-
arithmetic, geometry, etc. For example, there are mathe-
matical propositions about ellipses which show that ‘I cut
the elliptical cake in 8 equal parts’ does not make sense.
And there are mathematical propositions about circles which
show that it does make sense to say “I cut the circular cake
in 8 equal parts’. The terms ‘sense’ and ‘nonsense’, rather
than the terms ‘true’ and ‘false’, bring out the relation of
mathematical propositions to non-mathematical propositions
(AWL 152)15.
Thus, the difference between ‘rules of grammar’ and their negations is
not similar to the difference between true and false statements, but to the
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difference between a rule of expression and a use of words or symbols
which that rule excludes as nonsensical.
7 Hinges and the Boundaries of Rational Agency
To sum up, Wittgenstein’s ‘rules of grammar’ have three features which
make them different from empirical beliefs. Firstly, they are not descrip-
tive but normative; secondly, they cannot be confirmed or disconfirmed
by reality but, rather, are ways to make sense of reality ; finally, they
are not propositions as their negations are not false but senseless. With
these points in mind, consider the following passages of OC, in which
Wittgenstein explicitly compares Moore’s ‘obvious truisms’ to mathe-
matical truths:
“So is the hypothesis possible, that all the things around us
don’t exist? Would that not be like the hypothesis of our
having miscalculated in all our calculations? (OC 55)
I cannot be making a mistake about 12x12 being 144. And
now one cannot contrast mathematical certainty with the
relative uncertainty of empirical propositions. For the math-
ematical proposition has been obtained by a series of actions
that are in no way different from the actions of the rest of
our lives, and are in the same degree liable to forgetfulness,
oversight and illusion [. . . ] The mathematical proposition
has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of incontesta-
bility. I.e.: ”Dispute about other things; this is immovable -
it is a hinge on which your dispute can turn” (OC 651-655,
my italics).
If mathematical truths, qua rules of grammar, license possible ways to
describe reality, then to deny or doubt a rule such as v) 12x12=144 does
not display factual ignorance but rather the inability to competently
engage in the language game called ‘arithmetic’.
As I have already mentioned throughout this work, for Wittgenstein,
‘the game of doubting itself presupposes certainty’ (OC 115), that is that
something is taken for granted, at least the meaning of words (OC 676).
Accordingly, the skeptic’s never-ending doubt will deprive her words of
their meaning and will, at most, show her inability to engage in the
ordinary ‘language-game’ of asking meaningful questions, as to deny or
doubt that i) What is red must be colored and ii) Nothing can be red and
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green all over will display an agent’s inability to engage in any sensible
language game with color words.
This part of Wittgenstein’s proposal could be said to resemble
Wright’s rational entitlement strategy and it incurs similar problems.
Recall that, following Wright, we are rationally entitled to take for
granted ‘hinges’ such as ‘Human beings have bodies’ or ‘There are ex-
ternal objects’, for to dismiss them will end up with the impossibility of
pursuing any inquiry at all; as practical rational agency is a basic way
for us to act, it would be rational to say that we knew ‘hinges’, even if
in an unwarranted way.
As we have extensively seen supra, even if to take ‘hinges’ for granted
would be practically rational, for not to do so would lead to a cognitive
paralysis, a skeptic could nonetheless argue that the very fact that we
need to act as if ‘hinges’ are true does not make this acceptance epis-
temically rational.
But following Wittgenstein’s reflection on the normative nature of
‘hinges’, not to doubt or deny Moore’s ‘obvious truisms’ is not something
that we do merely out of practical considerations as in Wright’s proposal;
rather, it is a constitutive part of ‘the essence of the language-game’
called ‘epistemic inquiry’ (OC 370):
I want to say: propositions of the form of empirical proposi-
tions, and not only propositions of logic, form the foundation
of all operating with thoughts (with language) [. . . ] If I say
“we assume that the earth has existed for many years past”
(or something similar), then of course it sounds strange that
we should assume such a thing. But in the entire system
of our language-games it belongs to the foundations. The
assumption, one might say, forms the basis of action, and
therefore, naturally, of thought (OC 401-411, my italics).
As per Wittgenstein, ‘hinges’ such as ‘There are external objects’ and
‘Human beings have bodies’ play a basic, foundational role in our system
of beliefs, and to take them for granted belongs to our method of doubt
and enquiry (OC 151). In other words, even if they resemble empirical
propositions or their origin is empirical, within our practices they are
used as rules which enable us to make sense of reality, thus drawing a
line between sense and nonsense rather than between truth and falsity.
Thus, to doubt or deny Moore’s ‘obvious truisms of the commonsense’
would not only go against our practical rationality, but more crucially
would also undermine the very notion of ‘rational enquiry’.
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8 Wittgensteinian Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism
As we have seen, then, for Wittgenstein, Moore’s ‘commonsense cer-
tainties’ are a condition of possibility of any meaningful inquiry; as he
puts the matter, ‘about certain empirical propositions no doubt can
exist if making judgments is to be possible at all’ (OC 308, my ital-
ics). A thought which is stressed in a number of remarks of OC, where
Wittgenstein defines ‘hinges’ as ‘the scaffolding of our thoughts’ (OC
211), ‘foundation-walls’ (OC 248), the ‘substratum of all our enquiring
and asserting’ (OC 162), ‘the foundation of all operating with thoughts’
(401) and ‘fundamental principles of human enquiry’ (OC 670).
To understand a first promising anti-skeptical consequence of this
account, recall the putative ‘negation’ of the rules of grammar we have
encountered supra:
i*) p is red and is not colored
ii*) p is red and green all over
iii*) Some bachelors are married
iv*) a proposition is neither true nor false
v*) 12× 12 = 1212
As we have already seen above, Wittgenstein’s rules of grammar are
non-propositional in character, thus they cannot be either true or false;
accordingly, their ‘negation’ is not false but senseless, that is, an illicit
combination of signs.
In a similar fashion, as ‘hinges’ such as ‘Human beings have bodies’
or ‘There are external objects’ are not propositional, for they have a
normative rather than a descriptive role, then their putative ‘negation’
should be dismissed as an illicit (and not only fictional as in Moyal-
Sharrock’s proposal) combination of signs which is excluded from the
practice called ‘rational epistemic inquiry’, as the putative statement
v*) 12 × 12 = 1212 is a move excluded from the language-game called
‘arithmetic’.
To understand a promising anti-skeptical implication of this point,
recall the feature of Cartesian-style arguments:
(S1) I do not know not-SH
(S2) If I do not know not-SH, then I do not know M
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(SC) I do not know M
where not-SH can be a ‘hinge’ such as ‘Human beings have bodies’ or
‘There are external objects’. This argument seems compelling as long as
we take ‘hinges’ as propositional beliefs which can be either confirmed by
evidence or legitimately doubted once we run skeptical arguments. But
even if they resemble empirical contingent propositions, ‘hinges’ are non-
propositional rules of grammar which enable us to make sense of reality.
Accordingly, skeptical hypotheses such as ‘I might be a disembodied BIV’
should not be regarded as sensible philosophical challenges but rather as
nonsensical, even if prima facie meaningful, combinations of signs.
Another promising consequence of a non-propositional account so
construed is that, different from Moyal-Sharrock’s reading of OC, it will
not affect the Closure principle and at the same time will not lead to
skeptical conclusions.
Recall that following the non-epistemic reading, ‘the certainty of
hinges’ is a pre-rational, animal commitment which is not subject to
epistemic evaluation of any sort. Accordingly, following this account, we
will have either to reject Closure or, with this principle still in play, to
agree with the skeptic that our knowledge is impossible. Consider the
formulation of Closure proposed by Williamson ([44]) and Hawthorne
([14]) which we have encountered throughout this work:
The Competent Deduction principle
If S knows that p, and S competently deduces from p that q,
thereby coming to believe that q on this basis while retaining
her knowledge that p, then S knows that q.
The idea behind this version of Closure is in fact that an agent can come
to acquire new knowledge via competent deduction where this means
that the belief in question is based on that deduction. Accordingly, if we
cannot rule out a skeptical scenario such as the BIV one, given Closure
we would still be unable to know anything at all.
The non-propositional nature of Wittgenstein’s account of ‘hinges’
can help us to positively address this issue. As we have seen while
presenting Pritchard’s ‘hinge-commitment’ strategy, the crucial aspect
to note about Closure is that it involves an agent forming a belief on
the basis of the relevant competent deduction. But crucially, ‘hinges’
are not the expressions of a propositional attitude such as a belief in;
rather, they are the expression of non-propositional rules.16
Accordingly the negations of ‘hinges’, that is, skeptical hypotheses
such as ‘I might be a disembodied BIV’ or ‘I might be deceived by an
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Evil Demon’ are not beliefs either ; rather, they are just nonsensical com-
binations of signs, from which no valid inference or deduction (e.g. ‘If
I do not know not-SH, then I do not know M’) can be made. That is
to say, if skeptical hypotheses are not propositional beliefs but rather,
senseless negations of non propositional rules, then from the fact that we
don’t know whether we are victims of a skeptical scenario we cannot infer
or deduce that we don’t know everyday empirical propositions ; we are
thus in a position to retain Closure (which can be applied only to propo-
sitional beliefs, and not to nonsensical negations of non propositional
rules) and our confidence in our everyday knowledge claims.
9 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have argued that following the analogy between ‘hinges’
and rules of grammar, we should be able to get rid of skeptical hypothe-
ses. This is so because given the non propositional, normative nature
of ‘hinges’ such as ‘ There are external objects’ or ‘Human beings have
bodies’ their skeptical negations are not propositional beliefs but rather,
nonsensical, even if apparently meaningful, combinations of signs from
which no valid inference or deduction can be made17.
Notes
1 See [35].
2 This is essentially the formulation of the Closure principle defended by [44], 117,
and [14], 29.
3 While writing OC Wittgenstein was also heavily influenced by Henry Newman’s
lectures on religious beliefs (see [24], [25]). For a more detailed analysis of the
relationship between Newman’s and Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategies, see
[28].
4 Wright’s proposal is informed by his diagnosis of Moore’s Proof ([52]), from which
has originated a huge debate that would be impossible to summarize here. For a
critical analysis of Wright’s treatment of PEW see [36], [37], [38], [7] and [2], [3].
5 Cfr OC 342: [. . . ] it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that
certain things are indeed not doubted.
6 See OC 450: “A doubt that doubted everything would not be a doubt”.
7 Pritchard has explicitly addressed this issue, stating that even if his proposal
blocked the skeptical challenge it would nonetheless lead to what he names ‘epis-
temic angst’ or, more recently, ‘epistemic vertigo’. See [31]. Moreover, it should
be noted that Pritchard’s reflections on ‘hinges’ are only a part of a more com-
plex anti-skeptical framework.; the other part is called epistemological disjunc-
tivism ([34]) . As in this work I am focusing only on ‘Wittgenstein inspired’
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anti-skeptical proposals, to present and discuss the merits of Pritchard’s episte-
mological disjunctivism would go beyond the scope of this essay and is thus not
a task I shall set myself here.
8 It is worth noting that Pritchard ([30]) calls his own anti skeptical strategy non-
epistemic (268) and defines Moyal Sharrock’s proposal ‘non-propositional ’(265).
Still, Moyal Sharrock stresses the non epistemic, pre rational nature of ‘hinges’
while as we have seen above Pritchard focuses on the non propositional nature
of what he names ‘uber hinge commitments’; hence I preferred to call the former
strategy ‘non epistemic’.
9 See OC 308: ‘Knowledge’ and ‘Certainty’ belong to different categories. They
are not two ‘mental states’ like; say ‘surmising’ and ‘being sure’. (Here, I assume
that it is meaningful for me to say, “I know what (e.g.) the word “doubt” means
and that this sentence indicates that the word “doubt” has a logical role.) What
interests us now is not being sure but knowledge. That is, we are interested in
the fact that about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making
judgments is to be possible at all. Or again: I am inclined to believe that not
everything that has the form of an empirical proposition is one.
10 This line has been most notably proposed by [8], [9], [10], [11]) and [26].
11 According to the proponents of ‘many-valued logic’ such as [43], statements of
the form ‘a proposition which is neither true nor false’ are ‘borderline cases’,
whose truth value lies between 0 (full falsehood) and 1(full truth); thus, they
would not be mere senseless combinations of signs as in Wittgenstein’s account.
Even though this approach has been extremely useful to deal with a number of
philosophical issues such as ‘the vagueness problems’, this view is still far from
uncontroversial and has originated a huge debate that would be impossible to
summarize here. For an up to date discussion on multi-valued logic and the
‘vagueness problem’, see [42].
12 In the following, I will just sketch some uncontroversial aspects of Wittgenstein’s
philosophy of mathematics, in order to cast more light on his conception of ‘rules
of grammar’. A detailed reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s views on the matter
and of the debate they originated would fall beyond the scope of this work.
13 This is a slightly modified example used by [13], 269.
14 It is worth noting that Wittgenstein considers ‘senseless’ every combination of
signs excluded from a ‘rule of grammar’. This is so because as grammatical rules
are ways to make sense of reality, their correctness is antecedent to questions of
truth of falsity and so they lack a truth-value. Accordingly, their putative nega-
tions lack truth-value as well; thus, they cannot be considered strictly speaking
false but senseless, that is illicit, combinations of signs.
15 It could be argued that there are mathematical and geometrical discoveries, as
in the case of ‘Non-Euclidean’ geometry. Still, as per Wittgenstein, these are
different from empirical discoveries for they do not tell us anything about reality
but are, rather, different techniques to describe reality. See infra.
16 For a similar account of ‘hinges’ and their anti skeptical significance, see [4], [5]
. Roughly, as per Coliva ‘hinges’, even if propositional, have a normative role,
and their acceptance is a ‘condition of possibility’ of any rational enquiry. A first
difference between this account and the one I’m defending here goes as follows; ac-
cording to Coliva, hinges are propositional (albeit non –bipolar) ; on the contrary,
I claim that they are non propositional, hence their putative ‘negations’ (such
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as skeptical hypotheses)are senseless and excluded from our epistemic practices.
Moreover, and more importantly, Coliva proposes a limitation of the Closure
principle ([5], 86; a similar view is defended in [1]), which stems from her views
on warrant and epistemic justification that will be impossible to summarize here.
However, following my account of hinges there is no need to defend a limitation
of Closure; this is because if skeptical hypotheses SH such as ‘I might be a BIV’
or ‘ I might be deceived by an Evil Deceiver’ are senseless combinations of signs,
so are their putative ‘negations ‘ not-SH; then from the fact that we don’t know
whether we are victims of a skeptical scenario (‘I do not know not-SH’ where both
SH and its ‘negation’ are illicit combination of signs )we cannot infer or deduce
that we do not know our everyday propositions M even with a ‘strong’ version
of Closure in play. On Coliva’s reading of OC and its anti-skeptical implications,
see [21] and [31].
17 For a general introduction to OC see also [23] and [41]. Other influential ‘OC in-
spired’ anti-skeptical strategies are [6] and [45], [46], [47]. For a critical evaluation
of Conant’s and Williams’ proposals, see [39], [40].
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